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cables at sea. However, British naval su-
periority ensured that damage from
German attacks could be quickly re-
paired. Despite later German successes
in using submarines to attack undersea
cables, geography and infrastructure
left Great Britain as the hub of the re-
maining international communications
system. While some of this story will be
broadly familiar to readers of Barbara
Tuchman’s classic study The Zimmerman
Telegram, Winkler moves well beyond
Tuchman’s work, describing how Brit-
ain’s information blockade emerged as
a coordinated effort that complemented
and reinforced its naval and economic
blockades of Germany.
Initially, many in the U.S. government
and Navy were sympathetic to British
efforts. Even while neutral, the U.S.
Navy cooperated, by closing German
wireless stations in the United States.
However, the British stranglehold on
German communications had the effect
of leaving the United States dependent
on British cables to Europe and Latin
America. British monitoring of cable
traffic, a valuable source of military in-
telligence, also yielded commercial in-
formation that was used to further
British trade––often against U.S. com-
mercial interests. Reliable reporting of
news from Germany became impossi-
ble, leaving the neutral American press
dependent on British reporting of the
war. The divergence of American and
British interests forced the U.S. Navy’s
realization that control of communica-
tions had become an essential part of
control of the seas in the modern age.
In response, several U.S. government
agencies moved to build an American
cable network, but they were hampered
by British control of raw materials.
Others turned to emerging technology.
Largely through Navy efforts, the
United States ended World War I with
the largest radio network in the world.
However, the lack of a coordinated U.S.
strategy and poor interagency coordina-
tion ultimately prevented the nation
from dominating the international
communications system after the war.
Winkler asserts that the lessons learned
from this failure provided the impetus
for American dominance of interna-
tional communications in years
following the Second World War.
This is an excellent book with a com-
pelling story. Winkler deftly handles a
complex topic that cuts across issues of
naval history, intelligence, economics,
and technological change. Nexus is well
worth the time of any naval officer con-
templating the sources of American de-
pendence in a networked age.
DALE C. RIELAGE
Commander, U.S. Navy
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S.
Seventh Fleet
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler, The Germans, and the Final
Solution. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press,
2008. 394pp. $35
This insightful collection of essays from
the leading scholar of the Third Reich is
a must-read for any serious student of
the Second World War. Kershaw’s mas-
tery of the intricacies of the Nazi regime
is second to none, and he approaches
the historical controversies surrounding
its reign of terror in as calm and delib-
erate a manner as the topic permits.
Kershaw’s essays cover a variety of top-
ics, but he frequently returns to the
questions surrounding Adolf Hitler’s
direct involvement in implementing the
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“Final Solution” and how a nation so
seemingly advanced could have carried
out such monstrous crimes. The crux of
Kershaw’s argument is that the führer’s
“charismatic domination” of the Ger-
man people through a potent mix of
ideological zeal coupled with his great
skills in the art of propaganda paved the
way for the “Final Solution.”
On 30 January 1939, Hitler delivered a
lengthy speech in the Reichstag in
which he threatened the “annihilation
of the Jewish race in Europe” should
the Jews “succeed in plunging the na-
tions once more into a world war.” As
Kershaw notes, Hitler and his under-
lings would repeatedly cite that “proph-
ecy” over the course of the next three
years, as planning for the “Final Solu-
tion” intensified. (Interestingly, as the
war dragged on, the date of the “proph-
ecy” speech was deliberately altered by
the regime in its propaganda broadcasts
to 1 September 1939, to link it with the
onset of the war.) In 1942 alone, Hitler
referred to his “prophecy” in four na-
tionally broadcast radio addresses de-
signed to, as Kershaw puts it,
“condition the general population
against humanitarian sympathy for the
Jews” and, most disturbingly, signal
to the regime’s insiders Hitler’s
“knowledge and approval of the
genocide.”
Kershaw believes that one of the major
milestones on the road to a “compre-
hensive solution” of the “Jewish ques-
tion” was Hitler’s declaration of war
against the United States on 11 Decem-
ber 1941. The propaganda minister, Jo-
seph Goebbels, noted in his diary on 13
December that “the Führer is deter-
mined to make a clean sweep. . . . The
world war is here. The annihilation of
the Jews must be the necessary
consequence.” A little over five weeks
later, the infamous Wannsee Confer-
ence convened to plan, as SS-
Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich
put it, “the coming final solution of the
Jewish question.” What had until that
point been a localized and somewhat
“inefficient” extermination effort was
transformed into a Reich-wide, com-
prehensive genocide. None of this, as
Goebbels noted in March 1942, was
possible without the führer’s presence
as the “unswerving champion and
spokesman of a radical solution” to the
“Jewish question.”
Kershaw is to be commended for this
collection of essays, which, coupled
with a reading of his two-volume biog-
raphy of Hitler, should be required
reading for any serious student of Nazi
Germany and the Holocaust. We owe a
debt to Kershaw for the unpleasant but
essential enterprise of helping future
generations grapple with one of the




Blake, John. Charts of War: The Maps and Charts
That Have Informed and Illustrated War at Sea.
London: Conway Maritime, 2006. 160pp. $50
John Blake’s book is a masterful short
course on the maritime history of West-
ern civilization and chart making as it
has evolved through time. It traces the
history of sea charts from thirteenth-
century portolan wind charts to the
diagrammatic charts used to describe
pivotal phases of the sea operations
during the first Gulf war, in 1991. The
sea chart was particularly important to
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